Freedom of expression, even where exercised in a political or parodic context, does not in itself constitute “due cause” capable of authorising a third party to use a reputed trade mark without the proprietor’s consent. This was clarified by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 8 September 2026 in Case C-298/23, Inter IKEA Systems, concerning the delicate balance between trade mark protection and freedom of expression.

The dispute arose from an initiative launched by the Belgian political party Vlaams Belang, which in 2022 presented its proposed reform of asylum and immigration policies under the name “IKEA-PLAN – Immigratie Kan Echt Anders”. The campaign used signs corresponding to IKEA trade marks and graphic representations reminiscent of the Swedish company’s well-known assembly instructions. Inter IKEA, the proprietor of the trade marks concerned, consequently brought infringement proceedings before the Belgian courts.

The person responsible for the campaign acknowledged the unauthorised use of the trade marks, but argued that the reference to IKEA’s reputation was intended to enhance the effectiveness of the political message and was therefore justified by freedom of expression and political parody. The Belgian court asked the Court of Justice whether such considerations could constitute “due cause” capable, under EU trade mark law, of justifying the use by a third party of a sign identical with or similar to a trade mark with a reputation.

The Court rejected any automatic approach. Freedom of expression is unquestionably a fundamental right that must be taken into account when applying trade mark law, but merely invoking that right is insufficient. A person using another party’s trade mark must identify the specific reasons why such use is necessary or instrumental to the exercise of freedom of expression and establish that, in the circumstances of the case, those reasons outweigh the rights and interests of the trade mark proprietor.

It is therefore for the national court to carry out a specific balancing exercise between the fundamental rights at stake: on the one hand, the right to property and the economic and reputational interests of the trade mark proprietor; on the other, freedom of expression and the interests of the person using the sign. Neither set of rights enjoys absolute or predetermined precedence.

The judgment is significant well beyond the specific context of political communication. For companies, media organisations, associations and communications professionals, reliance on satirical, informational, artistic or critical purposes does not amount to a general authorisation to use reputed trade marks belonging to third parties. The lawfulness of such use must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific manner in which the sign is used, the purpose pursued, any advantage taken of the reputation of the trade mark and any potential detriment to the interests of its proprietor.

For proprietors of reputed trade marks, the judgment therefore confirms that the enhanced protection afforded under EU law may also apply to uses made in the context of political communication: freedom of expression forms part of the required balancing exercise, but it does not automatically override the exclusive rights conferred by the trade mark.